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Abstract
Part I of this Essay addresses the Community’s impact on national taxation in general. Part
II examines Article 95 of the EC Treaty concerning the prohibition on discriminatory internal
taxation. The aim is to show, based on a brief summary of the relevant legislation, to what extent
the Court has developed its case law in specific areas of Community tax law. Emphasis will then be
placed on the structure and various legal aspects of Article 95, which, although a rather complex
provision, often tends to be neglected in favour of the harmonized taxes as well as the recent
developments in the field of direct taxation.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the issues that has long been and will remain in the
front line of European Community ("EC" or "Community") disputes is the inherent tension between national taxation and the
requirements of the Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty").' The Court of Justice (the "Court") has already decided a considerable number of cases in this regard.2
The bid for harmonization laid down in Article 99 of the EC
Treaty' has led to considerable developments towards market integration in the field of indirect taxes. Article 99, however, is
inapplicable for direct taxes, which are dealt with by Articles 100
and 101. Tax equalization in this area is, therefore, restricted to
the implementation and functioning of the common market.
Additionally, the principle of subsidiarity4 has been invoked in
* Siegbert Alber is an Advocate General at the Court of Justice of the European
Communities. The author expresses his gratitude to Ass. Iur. Tim Hendrik Sperling,
who has helped with the preparation of this Essay.
1. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA].
2. In 1998, tax questions moved into first place with respect to preliminary rulings
of the Court ofJustice (the "Court"). See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, O.J. C 224/1,
at 63,
3 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689. With the addition of customs cases, tax
cases now make up the largest portion of all pending litigations.
3. Id. art. 9, O.J. C 224/1, at 11 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 594-95.
4. The principle of subsidiarity is defined in Article 3b of the Treaty establishing
the European Community ("EC Treaty"). It states that the European Community ("EC"
or "Community") should only take action where given the power to do so, where an
objective can be better attained at Community level than at national level, and where
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this sphere.
Part I of this Essay addresses the Community's impact on
national taxation in general. 5 Part II examines Article 95 of the
EC Treaty concerning the prohibition on discriminatory internal
taxation. The aim is to show, based on a brief summary of the
relevant legislation, to what extent the Court has developed its
case law in specific areas of Community tax law. Emphasis will
then be placed on the structure and various legal aspects of Article 95, which, although a rather complex provision, often tends
to be neglected in favour of the harmonized taxes as well as the
recent developments in the field of direct taxation.
I. TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. Direct Taxation
There is no express provision for EC competence concerning direct taxes, as this function is reserved for the Member
States, who are free to decide what activities to tax, who to tax,
and at what rates. This reserved competence, however, is subject
to two great principles of EC law, namely the principle of nondiscrimination 6 and the exercise of the four fundamental freedoms enshrined in the EC Treaty. These four concepts constitute the cornerstones of the edifice that is the single market.7
Both principles have jointly been incorporated, in derivative EC
law that has been enacted to give effect to the fundamental freesuch action is proportional to the objective pursued. Id. art. 3b, O.J. C 224/1, at 9
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590.
5. There are some situations, which cannot be covered here, in which the Community itself is directly or indirectly involved in tax gathering. For example, the Community is involved with the collection of the EC tax that all European employees pay, as
well as agricultural levies on imports from non-EC countries and the proceeds from the
common external tariff.
6. This principle, also known as the principle of equal treatment, means that Member States, acting within their own jurisdiction but in areas affected by the EC Treaty,
may not in any way discriminate on the grounds of nationality between the nationals of
Member States. The former President of the Court, Ole Due, is credited with having
described the principle of equal treatment as the most important legal development in
the latter half of the twentieth century.
7. The four freedoms are the free movement of goods, EC Treaty, supra note 1,
arts. 9-37, O.J. C 224/1, at 11-17 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 594-606, the free movement of persons, id. arts. 48-58, O.J. C 224/1, at 20-23 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 61216, the free movement of services, id. arts. 59-66, O.J. C 224/1, at 23-24 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 616-18, and the free movement of capital, id. arts. 67-73h, O.J. C 224/1, at
24-26 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 618-20.
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doms. An example of this incorporation can be found in Article
7 of Regulation No. 1612/68,8 which provides that "workers who
are nationals of a Member State are to enjoy, in the territory of
another Member State, the same tax advantages as national
workers." 9 In a number of cases the Court has sought to reach
balanced judgments ensuring the cohesion of the national tax
system on the one hand, and the Treaty rights of the individual
on the other.' °
In its jurisprudence, which has principally concerned nonresident taxpayers, the Court has scrutinized whether non-residents and residents are treated equally under the EC tax law. In
this process, it has also become necessary to take account of bilateral double-taxation conventions.'1 In a recent judgment of
May 12, 1998, in the Gilly case,12 the Court examined the compatibility of specific provisions of the France-Germany tax treaty
with Article 48 of the EC Treaty. Mrs. Gilly, a French national
working in Germany but living in France, was subject to German
income tax. She failed to benefit from the splitting system, however, due to her limited tax liability. The Court reiterated that
the abolition of double taxation is an objective of the EC Treaty.
In view of the lack of harmonization of direct tax matters or
other unifying measures such as multilateral treaties based on
Article 220 of the EC Treaty, however, the Member States are
competent to determine the criteria to eliminate such double
taxation.
Turning towards the future, it can be observed that taxation
8. See Council Regulation No. 1612/68, 257J.O. 2 (1968), o.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968
(II), at 475 (concerning freedom of movement for workers within Community). Another example is Council Directive No. 77/799/EEC, OJ. L 336/15 (1977) (regarding
mutual assistance by competent authorities of Member States in field of direct taxation).
9. Council Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 8, art. 7, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968
(II), at 477.
10. See, e.g.,
Finanzamt Koeln-Alstadt v. Roland Schumacker, Case C-279/93,
[1995] E.C.R. 1-225, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 450; Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Balastingen, Case C-80/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-2493, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 85; Asscher v. Staatssecretaris va Financien, Case C-107/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3089, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 61;
Imperial Chemical Industries v. Colmer, Case C-264/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4729, [1998] 3
C.M.L.R. 293.
11. For further reading on this specific area, see Paul Farmer, EC Law and National
Rules on Direct Taxation: A Phoney War?, 1 EC TAX REv. 13-29 (1998).
12. Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, Case C-336/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-2793, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R 607.
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is increasingly recognized as being a crucial factor for growth
and job creation in Europe. As a result, there have been calls for
further coordination on taxation in order to counter harmful
forms of tax competition and to maintain pressure on public expenditure. Consequently, the European Union's Finance Council, on December 1, 1997, agreed on a package to counter
"harmful tax competition." The package, which was reviewed
again a year later, is comprised of three elements: a proposal for
a directive to ensure a minimum level of taxation of cross-border
interest on savings, a code of conduct for business taxation, and
a proposal for a directive to eliminate withholding taxes on interest and royalty payments between associated companies.1 3
B. Indirect Taxation
The states of the Community operate indirect taxation systems in a great variety of fields, differing according to national
preference. Such tax discrepancies, apart from contributing to
the attraction of smuggling, have a considerable impact on the
markets, such as where a product will be produced and sold. Article 95 of the EC Treaty eliminates internal discrimination
within a Member State. It does not, however, eliminate divergences between Member States and, therefore, does not go far
enough to bring about full market integration. Given the heterogeneity of political ideologies in the Community, however, as
well as different national traditions in tax policy, it has proved
immensely difficult to make much progress in the area of harmonizing indirect taxation.
The Community has so far concentrated on three areas:
value-added tax, excise duties, and corporation tax.
1. Value-Added Tax
The biggest achievement in the harmonization of indirect
taxes concerns the Council directive on the harmonization of
the laws of the Members States relating to turnover taxes.' 4 The
13. It is interesting to note that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, following the example of the European Union ("EU" or "Union"), has
agreed to a set of guidelines on harmful tax competition very similar to the Union's
code. The European Commission ("Commission") has, subsequently, proposed to start
exploratory talks with third countries, notably Switzerland, Monaco, San Marino, Liechtenstein, and Andorra.
14. See Sixth Council Directive No. 77/388/EEC, O.J. L 145/1 (1977). For further
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system of turnover tax was replaced by the common system of
value-added tax ("VAT") and numerous provisions concerning
the structure of and the procedure for applying this system, including a uniform basis of assessment. The directive also led to
the replacement of financial contributions to the European
Community from Member States in favor of using the Commu15
nity's own resources.
Equalization of the VAT rates themselves has not occurred.
Instead, a minimum standard rate of fifteen percent, with no
fixed upper limit, has been set. In view of the introduction of
the single currency, the Commission has now proposed to introduce a fifteen to twenty-five percent band for the standard rate
of VAT as soon as possible to prevent a widening of the existing
16
defacto range in the Community.
There have been numerous cases brought before the Court
that have concerned primarily the interpretation of individual
clauses of the VAT directives, in the form of preliminary rulings.
The Court's most important recent decisions deal with three
things. The first one is the acquired right of VAT deduction,
which is applicable when the taxable person could never, by reasons beyond his control, carry out the intended taxable transactions.1 7 The second one, also known as equal treatment, is the
right of a taxpayer not established in the country concerned to
annex a duplicate where the original has been lost.1 8 The third
one is the recovery of sums paid but not due and the appropriate procedural time limits under national law.1 9
This mostly technical case law serves as a good demonstration of how far Community law has come in influencing national
taxation systems. At the same time, this case law makes clear
how increasingly difficult it has become to strike a balance bereading on the case law, see DR. BEN J.M. TERRA & JULIE KAjus, INTRODUCrION TO
VALUE-ADDED TAX IN THE EC (1993).

15. These resources, according to a decision of April 21, 1970, are to include those
accruing from value-added tax ("VAT") and obtained by applying a common rate of tax
on a basis of assessment determined in a uniform manner according to Community
rules.
16. Commission Press Release, IP/98/1175 (Dec. 23, 1998).
17. Belgian State v. Ghent Coal Terminal NV, Case C-37/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-1.
18. Soci&4 g~nrale des grandes sources d'eaux minerals francaises v.
Bundesamt ffir Finanzen, Case C-361/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3495.
19. In.co.ge. Srl, Joined Cases C-280-81/96, & C-10/97 (ECJ Oct. 22, 1998) (not
yet reported).
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tween equal application of EC provisions on the one hand and
leaving the Member States to deal with matters primarily unaffected by such provisions on the other.
Noteworthy are also two recent judgments of the Court concerning the applicability of the Community VAT system. In this
context, the Court has established the principle of fiscal neutral2
ity. 0

The principle of fiscal neutrality precludes differentiation between lawful and unlawful transactions in the application of
VAT, except where, because of the special characteristics of
certain products, all competition between a lawful economic
sector and an unlawful sector is precluded. That is not the
case where there is no absolute prohibition. Such a [lack of
an absolute prohibition] cannot, therefore, be sufficient to
remove exports of those products from the scope of the directive.
Subsequently, there have been a number of cases where the
Court was called upon to decide whether the litigated situation
fell under the principle of fiscal neutrality or not. In two preliminary rulings concerning trade of counterfeit currency 21 and narcotics, 2 2 the Court held this principle, and thus the VAT direc-

tives, to be inapplicable because the Court considered any competition between a legal and an illegal economic sector
impossible. In two later judgments, the Court held that the activities of unlawful games of chance 23 and the selling of counterfeit perfume products,

24

although contrary to certain protection

rights, did not warrant an absolute prohibition and that there
could quite possibly exist a competitive market for these products. Therefore, the VAT directives were applicable, with the
consequence of tax exemption for the litigants.
20. See, e.g., Lange v. Finanzamt Fuerstenfeldbruck, Case C-111/92, [1993] E.C.R.
1-4677, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R 573.
21. Witzemann v. Hauptzollamt Munchen Mitte, Case C-343/89, [1990] E.C.R. I4492.
22. See Einberger v. Hauptzollamt Freiburg, Case 294/82, [1984] E.C.R. 1177,
[1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 765; Mol v. Inspecteur der Inroerrechten, Case 269/86, [1988]
E.C.R. 3627, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. .729; Verreniging Happy Family v. Inspecteur der
Omzetbelasting, Case 289/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3669, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 743.
23. Karl-Heinz Fischer v. Finanzamt Donaueschingen, Case C-283/95, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-3369, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 1055.
24. R. v. John Goodwin & Edward Thomas Unstead, Case C-3/97, [1998] E.C.R. I3257, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 861.
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Although the Court has, in all of these cases, applied one
definition, it may be unclear exactly how the Court determines
whether there is per definitorem. This lack of clarity arises because
of the definition's absolute prohibitive nature, and because
there are no competing markets in the trade with counterfeit
currency and narcotics as opposed to that with unlawful games
of chance and counterfeit perfume products.
In the same context, the Court will again have to decide on
the principle of fiscal neutrality, regarding the request of a preliminary ruling from the Dutch Hoge Raad.2 5 This case concerns the question of whether the VAT directives are applicable
where a coffee shop table is rented out for the purpose of the
illegal but tolerated trade of narcotics.
Finally, the Court's jurisprudence on the deduction of VAT
according to the Sixth Council Directive deserves some attention. In its INZO and Ghent Coal Terminal NVjudgments,2 6 the
Court, in applying the "principle of fiscal neutrality," found that
the right of a taxable person to deduct the VAT payable by him
remains acquired where, by reason of circumstances beyond his
control, the taxable person has never made use of the goods or
services for the purpose of carrying out taxable transactions.
Shortly afterwards, in Belgocodex,27 the Court interpreted Article
2 of the First VAT-Directive 28 as not precluding a Member State
that granted its taxpayers the right to opt for taxation of certain
turnovers from abolishing that right retroactively.
The Belgocodex case concerned the Member States' right to
grant and to withdraw from its taxpayers the right of tax deduction, whereas Ghent Coal Terminal NV dealt with the objective persistence of an existing deduction right. It remains to be seen,
however, how the Court will deal with a case in which both features are involved. Such an opportunity might arise in the recent request for a preliminary ruling from the German
25. Staatssecretaris van Financi~n v. Coffeeshop "Siberia" Vof, Case C-158/98
(pending case).
26. INZO v. Belgian State, Case C-110/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-857, [1996] C.E.C.
(CCH) 490; Belgian State v. Ghent Coal Terminal NV, Case C-37/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-1.
27. Belgocodex SA v. Belgium, Case C-381/97 (ECJ Dec. 3, 1998) (not yet reported).
28. First Council Directive No. 67/227/EEC, 71 J.O. 1301 (1967), O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1967, at 14.
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Bundesfinanzhof 9 The request concerned whether the right to
deduct remains acquired where the taxable person has made use
of certain goods or services, but, by reasons of circumstances beyond his control such as a change in the law, is prevented from
carrying out taxable transactions.
2. Excise Duties
Excise duties, widely imposed on alcohol, tobacco, and petrol, have long caused problems in the pursuit of market integration because of the large variations in rates between the Member
States. As a first step, Directive 92/12/EEC ° and Directive 92/
108/EEC3 ' established general arrangements for products subject to excise duty as well as on the holding, movement, and
monitoring of such products. They draw a sharp distinction between the treatment of commercial cross-border trade, which is
subject to regulations and checks, and the activities of private
consumers, which are unrestricted. Furthermore, minimum duties on tobacco products, petroleum products, and alcoholic beverages have been set,3 2 thereby reducing the risks of fraud and
distortions in consumer buying patterns.
Nevertheless, there are still considerable differences in the
rate of excise duty levied on certain products, notably on alcoholic beverages.3 3 To this end, the Commission, in its 1985
white paper,34 stressed the need for a closer approximation of
excise duty rates and has since, on various occasions, proposed
common minimum as well as maximum rates. Both the Euro29. Bundesfinanzhof, Case C-396/98 (pending case) (notice regarding case is at
O.J. C 1 (1999)).
30. Council Directive No. 92/12/EEC, O.J. L 76/1 (1992).
31. Council Directive No. 92/108/EEC, O.J. L 390/124 (1992).
32. Council Directive No. 92/79/EEC, O.J. L 316/8 (1992), amended by 0.J. L 316/
12 (1992) (Council Directive No. 92/81/EEC), amended by 0.J. L 316/19 (1992) (Council Directive No. 92/82/EEC), amended by 0.J. L 316/21 (1992) (Council Directive No.
92/83/EEC), amended by 0.J. L 316/39 (1992) (Council Directive No. 92/84/EEC).
The minimum figure chosen for excise rates levied on still and sparkling wine, however,

is zero.
33. The rate of excise duty levied on alcoholic beverages is five times higher than
the minimum laid down in Council Directive No. 92/79/EEC in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, whereas wine is rated zero in Italy, Germany,
Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Austria, and Portugal (all wine-producing Member
States).
34. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final
(June 1985).
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pean Parliament and the Council have so far rejected this approach, and any change in the existing rates is subject to unanimous agreement of the Council.
3. Corporation Tax
The most notable harmonization development in this area
has been Directive 69/335/EEC on corporation tax dealing with
indirect taxes on the raising of capital.3 5 There has been one
major series of judgments recently concerning whether EC law
prohibits the recovery of sums paid but not due. 36
In the current political discussion, it is widely believed that
lower tax levels may encourage companies to relocate, making
any further harmonization a most sensitive issue. The European
Parliament has, in this context, tried to indicate that decisions
on relocations are often based on a great variety of reasons, such
as easy access to the market, lower production costs, currency
37
exchange risks, availability of skilled labor, and infrastructure.
II. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATORY INTERNAL
TAXATION: ARTICLE 95 OF THE EC TREATY
A. The Structure of Article 95
Article 95 states:
(1) No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on
the products of other Member States any internal taxation of
any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on
similar domestic products.
(2) Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a
35. Council Directive No. 69/335/EEC, 249 J.O. 25 (1969), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1969 (II), at 412.
36. Fantask a/s v. Industriministeriet, Case C-188/95, (1997] E.C.R. 1-6783, [1998]
1 C.M.L.R. 473; Edilizia Industriale Siderurgica Sri (Edis) v. Ministero delle Finanze,
Case C-231/96 (ECJ Sept. 15, 1998) (not yet reported); Ministero delle Finanze v. Spac
SpA, Case C-260/96 (ECJ Sept. 15, 1998) (not yet reported); Ansaldo Energia SpA v.
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case C-279/96 (ECJ Sept. 15, 1998) (not yet
reported). For the latest developments in this area, see Avery Jones, Flows of Capital
Between the EU and Third Countries and the Consequences of Disharmony in the EuropeanInternational Tax Law, 2 EC TAX REV. 95, 106 (1998).
37. Council Resolution, O.J. C 200/38 (1997) (concerning coordination of fiscal
and taxation policy in monetary union).
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nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.

38

In contrast to Article 12 of the EC Treaty, the importance of
which has diminished with the widespread elimination of duties
between Member States, Article 95 remains an important tool
for ensuring that the internal market continues to function.
The former provision is different because, in the case of Article
95, a charge is levied on the product for the crossing of a tax
border instead of that of a state. Legally, Articles 12 and 95 are
complementary yet mutually exclusive, meaning that a fiscal
charge may fall under one or the other provision with no room
for overlap. The demarcation, however, between a customs duty
and a charge forming part of a general system of internal taxation is not always simple to locate. 9
The first paragraph of Article 95 outlaws discrimination
where similar products are in issue. The second paragraphs forbids indirect protection of products from competing imports.
Common to both paragraphs is a distinction between direct and
indirect discrimination, the latter being susceptible to justification by the taxing state.
For the purpose of Article 95(1), the Court has had the opportunity to develop its jurisprudence in a large number of cases
concerning issues that arise when two products are similar.
More recently, the Court also considered the meaning of domestic products. These cases, together with the usually indispensable analysis under Article 95(2), represent a complex and often
confusing area of EC law.
1. Direct Discrimination
Examples of national taxation overtly discriminating against
imported products are relatively rare given the unequivocal
wording of Article 95. There have been cases, however, concerning a national taxation system effectively benefiting imported
products4' that were nonetheless declared unlawful by the
Court, when there existed only a possibility of discrimination
38. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 95, O.J. C 224/1, at 31 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 632.
39. For further reading, see PAUL FARMER & RIC-HARD LxAL, EC TAX LAw 38-42
(1994).
40. So-called "reverse discrimination" rules, which place national products at a disadvantage compared to imports, are not objectionable from the perspective of Community law.

778

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:768

against the imported product.4 1 This early example demonstrates the Court's determination to eliminate fiscal discrimination by means of applying strict standards and rejecting the notion still invoked by Member States in litigations today that an
overall view should consider the effect of a taxation system.
When assessing whether or not a system is discriminatory, it
is necessary to consider not only the rate of tax, but also the basis
of its assessment and the rules for levying the various duties.4 2
The Court has reiterated this reasoning in its recent Grundigftaliana SpA 43 judgment, which concerned an Italian consumption
tax on audiovisual and photo-optical products. The system, inter
alia, did not include transport or distribution costs for products
manufactured in Italy. It also provided for a flat-rate deduction
for the purpose of calculating the taxable amount for domestic
producers only. Article 95 of the EC Treaty was thus found to
have been infringed by this legislation because it represented criteria that were likely to increase the value of the imported product vis-d-vis the corresponding domestic product.
There have also been cases where the Court had to determine whether such a discriminitive measure belonged to the internal taxation system or whether it was more characteristic of
general technical rules. For example, a technical rule might
concern the form of payment or its due date. This distinction is
important for the purpose of Community law because non-fiscal
trade barriers are subject to the separate regime of Article 30 of
the EC Treaty, entitled Elimination of the Quantitative Restric44
tions between Member States.
In some cases, however, such a distinction has not always
been easy to make. In ajudgment of March 22, 1977, the Court
stated:
However wide the field of application of Article 30 may be, it
nevertheless does not include obstacles to trade covered by
other provisions of the treaty. Thus obstacles which are of a
41. Bobie Getrdnkevertrieb GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Aachen-Nord, Case 127/75,
[1976] E.C.R. 1079 (concerning German tax on beer (Biersteuergesetz)).
42. See Commission v. Ireland, Case 55/79, [1980] E.C.R. 481, 488, [1980] 1
C.M.L.R 734, 737 (regarding collection of duty on alcoholic drinks).
43. Grundig Italiana SpA v. Ministero delle Finanze, Case C-68/96, [1998] E.C.R.
1-3775.
44. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 30, O.J. C 224/1, at 15 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 602.
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fiscal nature or have equivalent effect and are covered by Articles 9 to 16 and 95 of the Treaty do not fall within the prohibition in Article 30.
This reasoning seems to suggest that the relationship between Articles 30 and 95 is lex specialis over the other. The second sentence must be interpreted as implying the existence of a
demarcation line between obstacles of a fiscal nature and those
of a non-fiscal nature.
In the Drexl case, the Court purportedly missed an opportunity for a more precise comment on this demarcation line.
Drexl, a German national, was prosecuted in Italy for importing
a Volkswagen without paying the sum due under VAT. Subsequently, he had his car confiscated as a penalty, although this
sanction would not have been applied to a comparable misdemeanor within Italy. In its decision, the Court did not mention
Article 30 at all. Similarly, in the GrundigItalianaSpA judgment,
the Court held that "a charge such as the national consumption
tax at issue... must be regarded as an integral part of a general
system of internal taxation within the meaning of Article 95 of
the Treaty."4 6
One of the reasons for the Court's reserve in commenting
on the demarcation between Articles 30 and 95 may have been
that the result of the litigation was unaffected by the choice of
one article rather than the other, for the discriminatory practice
plainly violated Community law.

2. Indirect Discrimination
Article 95 of the EC Treaty also covers national systems that,
on their face, discriminate on the basis of factors other than origin, but nonetheless produce an effect that prejudices the imported product. Article 95 concerns national taxation that is
seemingly based on non-discriminatory factors, such as the cubic
capacity of a car or the production methods of liqueur wines, but
intends to protect or favor the domestic production. The best
known example for such a system is the French road tax that
applied a bigger levy on vehicles above 16-CV horsepower. Incidentally, no French cars are manufactured above 16-CV horse45. lannelli & Volpi v. Meroni, Case 74/76, [1977] E.C.R. 557, 559, [1977] 2
C.M.L.R. 688, 692.
46. Grundigltaliana,[1998] E.C.R. at 3801-10.
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power. The Court held this system of taxation incompatible with
47
the Treaty.
An important difference between cases of direct and indirect discrimination is the possibility of objective justification,
similar to Articles 30 and 119 of the EC Treaty. This possibility
means that an objectively justifiable reason that is unconnected
to nationality is capable of explaining the selection of the factor
that operates indirectly to discriminate on grounds of nationality. This model is commonly referred to as the indirect-discrimination/objective-justification model. The Court accepts a national justification under three conditions. The state concerned
must invoke a lawful objective, must be apt to achieve it, and
must observe the principle of proportionality. Examples of such
objectives have been high taxes on particular car types in order
to encourage the use of more environmentally-friendly models4 8
and certain concessions on products in order to support economically weak areas.4 9
This model, however, naturally encourages the Court to
play a potentially intrusive role in judging whether Member
States' policy choices fall within the sphere of action permitted
under Community law. This encouragement can happen particularly when the first of the said conditions, the lawful objective,
is met. One might ask whether French car production is so different an objective than certain economically underdeveloped
areas. In fact, it has been argued that there have been inconsistencies in the Court's rulings in this context.5 °
It is indeed not always a simple task for the Court to intrude
into a Member State's own taxation system for the purpose of
applying Article 95 of the EC Treaty. The French road tax again
serves as a good example. The Court originally held that the tax
violated Article 95 on two subsequent occasions, but, in a later
47. See Michel Humblot v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux, Case 112/84, [1985]
E.C.R. 1367, [19861 2 C.M.L.R. 338; see also Feldain v. Services Fiscaux du Departemente du Haut-Rhin, Case 433/85, [1987] E.C.R. 3536.
48. Commission v. Italy, Case 200/85, [1986] E.C.R. 3953, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 97
(regarding value-added tax on diesel cars).
49. Commission v. France, Case 196/85, [1987] E.C.R. 1597, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R.
851 (regarding natural sweet wines).
50. See, e.g., Alex Easson, Fiscal Discrimination: New Perspectives on Article 95 of the
EEC Treaty, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 521 (1981); Massimiliano Danusso & Ross Denton,
Does the European Court of Justice Look for a ProtectionistMotive Under Article 95?, 1990/1
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judgment of November 30, 1995, the Court found that a different road tax was justifiable. In a decision of December 21, 1998,
however, the Commission expressed the view that the amended
French road tax system was again in violation of Article 95, and it
has since filed infringement proceedings against France. 5 '
3. Applicability on Exports
Although Article 95 of the EC Treaty makes no reference to
exports, there are two possible discriminatory practices, namely
taxing exports at a lower rate than domestic products and taxing
exports at a higher rate. Only in the latter case has the Court
taken the view that the explicit terms of Article 95 should be
extended to cover fiscal discrimination against exports, 2
whereas the lower taxing of exports favors the export over the
domestic product and is therefore a case of permissible "reverse
discrimination.
4. Problems with Exotic Imports
A particular issue in the context of Article 95 arises where a
state does not itself produce a particular item and therefore has
no tax applicable to the domestic product. On the one hand, it
is obvious that the Member States must nevertheless be allowed
to put a levy on such products. On the other hand, the prohibition on discriminatory internal taxation may still apply, for
otherwise such imported products would not be afforded the
same protection under the EC Treaty as products that are domestically produced.
In various judgments, the Court has defined the scope of
Article 95 in this regard. First of all, Article 95 does not apply to
imports where there is no similar or competing national product. Taxation of such products may, of course, be susceptible to
control under Articles 12 and 30 regarding the free movement
51. Commission Press Release, IP/98/1157 (1998). It may be interesting to note
that this French system is also the object of a request for a preliminary ruling by the
French Tribunal de Grande Instance Epinal, in the pending cases Lamboley SA v. Administration des impdts, Case C-231/98, and Reni Bouctot v. Administration des impdts, Case C232/98.
52. Statens Kontrol Med Aedle Mettdler (Natural Precious Metals Control Authority) v. Preben Larsen, Case 142/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1543, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 680.
53. See supra note 40.

782

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:768

of goods and the elimination of customs duties.5 4 Once it is established that the charge relates "to a general system of internal
dues applied systematically to categories of products in accordance with objective criteria irrespective of the products," 5 such a
tax should then be considered in the light of Article 95.
Again, the requirements of Article 95(1) and (2) have to be
met, which the Court very plainly demonstrated in the case of
the Italian tax on bananas. 5 6 Banana production in Italy is confined to Sicily and is so insignificant that the tax was primarily
applicable to imported goods. As regards Article 95 (1), bananas
were found to be dissimilar to table fruit typical of Italian production. The Court, however, held that bananas competed with
other fruit for the purposes of Article 95(2) and considered the
tax too high, exerting a prohibited protective effect.
5. Tax Refunds
In some cases, the Court has had to examine the use to
which the proceeds of a tax are put in order to uncover a discriminatory effect. If a domestic product is refunded the tax in
full, then it has to be considered as not levied at all. In comparison, the imported product makes Article 12 of the EC Treaty
applicable. If the refund is partial, then Article 95 remains the
legal basis. In cases where a domestic product gets other benefits than the original tax, such as where there is no direct link
between the money raised and the money refunded, Article 95 is
inapplicable. In those cases, Article 92, governing aids granted
by states, may be violated.5 7
In a recent judgment concerning charges on the marketing
of meat and offal in Portugal, the Court reiterated these principles, stating:
A charge levied on domestic and imported products
alike constitutes a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty, prohibited by Articles 9 and 12 of the Treaty, if the
revenue from it is intended to finance activities benefiting
54. See, e.g., Commission v. Denmark, Case C-47/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-4509.
55. Commission v. France, Case 90/79, [1981] E.C.R. 283, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 1
(regarding French law imposing levies on reprographic equipment that was to large
extent imported).
56. Cooperativa Co-Frutta v. Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case 193/
85, [1987] E.C.R. 2085.
57. See STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW 404 (1995).
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only the taxed domestic products and if the resultant advantages fully offset the burden which the latter products bear; if
those advantages only partly offset the burden borne by the
domestic products, the charge constitutes discriminatory in95 of the Treaty and
ternal taxation prohibited by Article
58
must be reduced proportionally.
B. The Spirits Cases
As explained above, the Court's jurisprudence on the fiscal
treatment of alcoholic beverages has produced a number of
judgments that have covered nearly all aspects of Article 95.
There have been regular disputes about how to tax the vast
range of alcoholic drinks that share certain common features,
yet also display differences such as flavor.
1. Cases Concerning France, 5 962 Denmark,60 Italy,6 1

and Greece

The issue in these cases concerned tax systems that set different tax levels for different drinks, but tended to offer particularly favorable rates to the traditional domestic products. France
favored cognac over whisky, Italy, grappa over rum, Greece, ouzo
and brandy over other spirits, and Denmark granted tax advantages to aquavit compared with competing imported spirits. In
these cases, however, the Court chose not to specify whether the
beverages were similar for the purposes of Article 95(1), or competing for the purpose of Article 95 (2). The Court was satisfied
that the taxation system was, in any case, discriminatory. The
implied argument seemed to have been, that if not similar, the
products were at least competing. If not discriminatory, the regime was at least protective.
France's system of taxation in this regard has again been
brought before the Court, in a request for a preliminary ruling
58. Fazenda Pfiblica v. Fricarnes SA, Case C-28/96, [1997] E.C.R. 1-4939.
59. Commission v. France, Case 168/78, [1980] E.C.R. 347, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 631.
60. Commission v. Denmark, Case 171/78, [1980] E.C.R. 447, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R.
688.
61. Commission v. Italy, Case 169/78, [1980] E.C.R. 385, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 673;
Commission v. Italy, Case 323/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2275.
62. Commission v. Greece, Case C-230/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1909.
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by the French Tribunal de Grande Instance Epinal.63 It concerns
the compatibility, with Article 95, of the minimum levy on beer
of ECU1,87 per hi/degree alc., compared with that of zero percent on wine.
2. The Case Concerning the United Kingdom6 4

For tax purposes, the United Kingdom was alleged, for obvious reasons, to favor beer over wine. The Court analyzed more
deeply than it had in the previous cases, in which it utilized a
globalized approach. After it had been supplied with detailed
information about the actual nature of the competitive relationship between the two products in the United Kingdom, it held
that, although beer and wine were not similar, there was an element of interchangeability between beer and wines at the cheap
end of the market. As a consequence, the heavier tax on wine
afforded indirect protection to beer contrary to Article 95(2).
C. Recent Developments in the Court'sJurisprudence
In an important judgment of August 11, 1995,65 concerning
the Benelux system on the unification of certain rates of excise
duty,6 6 the Court took up the opportunity to comment on the
expressions "similar products," "domestic products," and "indirect protection." Certain Dutch wine importers, who had been
unable to obtain tax exemptions for fruit wines, claimed that the
Dutch legislation was incompatible with Article 95, in so far as it
taxed wines differently according to whether they had been
made from grapes or from other fruit. These wine importers
made their argument because of the preferential treatment afforded grape wines produced in Luxembourg. The disputed
products were certain kinds of grape wine, still fruit wines, as
well as champagne and sparkling fruit wines.
The Court held that all fruit wines or grape wines produced
63. See Soci~t6 critouridienne de distribution (Socridis) v. M. le Receveur principal
des douanes, Case C-166/98 (pending case).
64. Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 170/78, [1980] E.C.R. 417, [1980] 1
C.M.L.R. 816; Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 170/78, [1983] E.C.R. 2265,
[1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 512.
65. F.G. Roders BV and Others v. Inspecteur der Inroerrechten en Accijnzen,
Joined Cases C-367-377/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-2229.
66. Convention Relating to the Unification of Excise Duties and of Fees for Warranty of Articles of Precious Metals, Feb. 18, 1950 (concerning fermented fruit beverages and sparkling fermented beverages).
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in the Benelux countries are to be regarded as domestic products for the purpose of Article 95 (1). More importantly, though,
was the assumption by the Court regarding both clause one and
clause two of Article 95, that it is for the national court to assess
whether the products in question were similar and whether the
national charge would have a discriminatory effect on competing imported products. One of those criteria indicated by the
Court was the impact of a charge on the competitive relationships between the products concerned. It is exactly this notion
that was already invoked in Commission v. United Kingdom.6 7 The
Court is obviously putting emphasis on consumer habits, but entrusts the national courts with the factual evaluation of this relationship in order to conclude whether the national system is or
is not in compliance with Article 95 of the EC Treaty. The judgment has also contributed to the clarity between Article 95(1)
and (2) for future litigations.
CONCLUSION
Raising revenue is a cherished aspect of national sovereignty
and therefore remains jealously guarded by the Member States.
Fiscal integration in the Community has, nonetheless, come a
considerable way, considering the state of unification, harmonization, and the impact that the Court's case law has had on national tax systems.
This Essay showed to what extent the Court has, for the sake
of common policies and to abolish discrimination, reached into
the realm of national competence, while trying to leave enough
room for "national maneuver." The Court has managed this task
very well, although some argue that the Court's success comes at
the cost of legal clarity.
Pending further harmonization, which in light of the discussion on the Community's own resources as well as on Agenda
2000, will remain a lively issue, the Court's guidance through
Article 95 of the EC Treaty and its various elements will be a
precious asset and support for the further development of EC
law.

67. See supra note 64.

